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NOTES & COMMENTS 
SUPERIMPOSED NATIONS: THE JAY TREATY AND 
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 
DENISE EVANSt 
I. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The Blood reserve in Southern Alberta lies 22 kilometres north of 
the Canada-United States border. The Blackfeet reserve in north-
ern Montana extends to the border. The Blood and Blackfeet were 
originally confederate nations when the United States and Canada 
imposed the division between them. The Bloods had allegedly been 
promised that the reserve would extend south to the border, but 
the Canadian government established it further north. 1 
Members of the bands are related to one another, socialize with 
one another, and participate in religious and cultural events to-
gether. "Indian Days" are celebrated by both bands, as are rodeos, 
sports events, and dances. Each event has a considerable number of 
participants and observers from the other side of the border in at-
tendance. The nearest place for the Blood to obtain alcohol is in 
Babb, Montana, and the nearest place for the Blackfeet to obtain 
groceries is in Cardston, Alberta. In addition, crafts and religious 
items are often traded between the reserves. This interconnection 
between the two reserves means that the border is frequently 
crossed by the members of both bands, in both directions. 
The presence of the border means that the Blood and Blackfeet 
nations are subject to Canadian and American customs and immi-
gration laws. Blackfeet friends and relatives of Blood tribe members 
may be denied admission to Canada. Blood and Blackfeet persons 
may have their vehicles searched, their trade restricted, and their 
religious items handled disrespectfully. Certain religious items may 
be denied entry into Canada or the United States because they are 
t B.A. (Lethbridge), LLB. anticipated 1995. 
1 S. O'Brien, "The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing Tribal Sovereignty, 
Economies and Families" (1984) 53 Fordham L. Rev. 315 at 322. 
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made of animal parts. People may only cross the border between 
7:00 am and 11:00 pm when Carway, the port of entry between the 
reserves, 1s open. 
The situations described in this paper2 are not unique to the 
Blood and Blackfeet nations; they may occur anywhere that the 
Canada-United States border has divided allies and nations among 
Native peoples. For example, the Mohawk-St. Regis reserve is di-
vided by the Canada-United States border and by the Ontario-
Quebec border, which creates additional problems with tribal gov-
ernment and makes the members subject to three different legal 
systems. The Canada-United States border also divides the 
Okanagan band between British Columbia and Washington State. 
Canada's Immigration Act 3 states: "No person, other than a 
person described in section 4, has a right to come into or remain in 
Canada."4 Persons described in section 4 are Canadian citizens and 
permanent residents. Subsection 4(3) says: 
A person who is registered as an Indian pursuant to the 
Indian Act has, whether or not that person is a Canadian 
citizen, the same rights and obligations under this Act as 
a Canadian citizen. 
First Nations people who live in the United States may be regis-
tered pursuant to the Indian Act 5 in Canada. All other United 
States resident First Nations people who do not have Canadian citi-
zenship are considered to be visitors or immigrants. Most residents 
of the Blackfeet reserve who seek to come into Canada to attend an 
event on the Blood reserve are therefore admitted under subsection 
5(3) of the Immigration Act: 6 
A visitor may be granted entry and allowed to remain in 
Canada during the period for which he was granted entry 
or for which he is otherwise authorized to remain in 
Canada if he meets the requirements of this Act and the 
regulations. 
2 These situations were witnessed during the course of the writer's employment 
as a Customs Officer (and Primary Examining Immigration Officer) at various 
ports of entry in Southern Alberta from 1990 to 1992. 
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2. 
4 Ibid s. 5(1). 
5 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
6 Supra note 3. 
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Section 10 (student and employment authorizations) and sec-
tion 19 (inadmissible classes) of the Act are used to restrict the ac-
tivities of Blackfeet people. It is a daily occurrence at the Carway 
office of Employment and Immigration Canada for a Blackfeet? 
person to be refused entry under paragraph 19 (2) (a. l) of the 
Immigration Act: 8 
No immigrant and, except as provided in subsection (3) 
[persons who can satisfy the officer that the purpose jus-
tifies admission], no visitor shall be granted admission if 
the immigrant or visitor is a member of any of the fol-
lowing classes: 
(a. l) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe 
(i) have been convicted outside Canada of an offence 
that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an 
offence that may be punishable by way of indictment 
under any Act of Parliament by a maximum term of 
imprisonment of less than ten years, or 
(ii) have committed outside Canada an act or omis-
sion that constitutes an offence under the laws of the 
place where the act or omission occurred and that, if 
committed in Canada [could be punished by less 
than ten years] . 
[except if the person satisfies the Minister of his or her 
rehabilitation and for whom at least five years have 
passed since the sentence or the offence]. 
Paragraph 19(2)(b) bars entry by persons with two or more sum-
mary convictions, or the equivalent thereto within five years of the 
date of seeking entry. Paragraph 19(1)(c.l) bars entry to those with 
an indictable offence punishable with at least ten years. The Act also 
bars entry to those who have committed offences within Canada. 
In practice, one or two impaired driving convictions in the dis-
tant past suffice to bar a person entry to Canada. Neither the actual 
punishment given for the offence, nor whether the prosecution pro-
ceeded by way of misdemeanor or felony, are relevant to the de-
7 The Blackfeet people are not the same as the Blackfoot people; thus, the singular 
form of"Blackfeet" is "Blackfeet." 
8 Supra note 3. 
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termination of admissibility. The criterion used is whether the of-
fence could be an indictable offence in Canada without regard to 
whether the offence would in fact have been proceeded against by 
way of indictment. Many of those barred under paragraph 
19(2)(a. l) who have committed the offence more than five years 
earlier do not take advantage of the exception in paragraph 
19(2)(a.l), whereby they may convince the Minister of their 
rehabilitation, either through inability to understand it, or through 
lack of opportunity to exercise the option. 
The sections of the Act regarding employment in Canada prove 
to be a barrier during haying season and branding season, when 
Blood farmers need the help of friends and relatives. 
"Employment" is defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration 
Act 9 as follows: 
"employment" means any activity for which a person re-
ceives or might reasonably be expected to receive valuable 
consideration. 
Exchange of crafts also presents a problem with both Customs and 
Immigration. If the craftsperson brings the crafts into Canada to 
sell, a commercial customs entry form (B-3) must be completed, 
and duty and taxes on the goods must be paid. Because the 
craftsperson is considered employed in Canada, he or she must 
also obtain employment authorization. 
The Canada-United States border presents a multitude of 
problems for the Blood and Blackfeet people. Many of their daily 
activities are regulated by the unwanted intervention into and regu-
lation of their inter-band co-operative activities by the two foreign 
governments. This paper will explore the possibility of achieving, 
through the Canadian legal system, the right freely to cross the 
border without restriction by the Immigration Act; a right, it will be 
argued, that is inherent for aboriginal peoples. 
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
For approximately ten years prior to 1794, the British and the 
Americans on the North American continent had had an uneasy 
truce. The British, at that time more powerful than the Americans, 
9 Supra note 3. 
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had imposed high duties and other restrictions on American 
traders, and had removed slaves from the United States during the 
American Revolution of 1776. 10 These conflicts led to American 
John Jay's negotiations in London with British leaders, resulting in 
the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation 11 (the Jay Treaty), 
signed on 19 November 1794. Article III of the Treaty states: 
It is agreed that it shall at all times be free to His 
Majesty's subjects, and to the citizens of the United 
States, and to the Indians dwelling on either side of the 
said boundary line, freely to pass and repass by land or 
inland navigation, into the respective territories and 
countries of the two parties, on the continent of America 
... and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each 
other . . . . [N] or shall the Indians passing or repassing 
with their own proper goods and effects of whatever na -
ture, pay for the same any impost or duty whatever. But 
goods in bales, or other large packages, unusual among 
Indians, shall not be considered as goods belonging bona 
fide to Indians. 
Article XXVIII of the Treaty states, "the first ten articles of this 
treaty shall be permanent." 
First Nations were included in the treaty because of fears that 
hostile reactions by the Native peoples would disrupt Anglo-
American peace. 12 There are indications that the reference to First 
Nations people resulted from pressure by the British negotiators. 
For example, Albert J. Beveridge, in The Life of John Marshall, when 
referring to Article III wrote that 
the British secured from us ... liberty of Indians and 
British subjects to pass our frontiers, trade on our soil. ... 
an odious provision, which, formerly, had never occurred 
to anyone. 13 
10 M. Wilkin, The jay Treaty: Ratification and Response, (M.A. Thesis, North 
Texas State University, 1980) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 
1980) at 4. 
11 (U.S.-Gr. Brit.) 12 Bevans 13. 
12Supra note 10 4. See also D. A. Booth, The Constitutional and Political Aspects 
of the jay Treaty 1794-1796 (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1957) (Ann 
Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1957) at 40 where an American 
speaker is quoted as saying that the British had "set the savages on our backs." 
13 Quoted in Booth, ibid. at 103. 
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Free passage of the border was essential for Anglo-First Nations 
relations. At that time, the British were signing treaties with the 
First Nations as nations in their own right. The imposition of bor-
der controls by Britain and the United States would have shown the 
First Nations that Britain was not prepared to consider them as in-
dependent political entities. The good will of the First Nations 
people was also important to Britain in keeping American en-
croachment on the border to a minimum. Prior to the signing of 
the Jay Treaty, it had been the hope of Britain that the First 
Nations would form a buffer zone between Canada and the United 
States, leaving the Great Lakes for Britain. 14 British officials offered 
to mediate a settlement between the American government and the 
First Nations for an "Indian Buffer State" between the two 
countries, where Britain and the U.S. would "withdraw all claims of 
possessions whatever .... "15 Negotiations for this fell through, but 
the same motivation seems to be behind the inclusion of Article III. 
One year after the Jay Treaty was signed, the Ojibway, 
Potowatome, Huron, and Ottawa Nations were reassured that the 
border would not affect their mobility: 
[The King] has ... taken the greatest care of the rights 
and independence of all the Indian nations who by the 
last Treaty with America, are to be perfectly free and 
unmolested in their trade and hunting grounds and to 
pass and repass freely undisturbed to trade with whom 
they please. 16 
The United States attempted, in 1795, to license First Nations 
traders, thus restricting which of them could trade with the 
British.17 Britain took this to be a violation of Article III of the Jay 
Treaty and proposed that it be agreed that no stipulation entered 
into after the Jay Treaty should be taken to derogate from the 
rights in Article III. 18 This resulted in the Explanatory Article to the 
14 J. A. Combs, Power, Politics and Ideology: A Case Study of the fay Treaty (Ann 
Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1964) at 136. 
15 Supra note 12 at 146-51. 
l6 Quoted in O'Brien, supra note 1 at note 26. 
l7 Treaty of Grenville, (U.S.-Wyandots, Delawares, and other Tribes) 3 August 
1795, 7 Stat. 49. 
18 J. Bigelow, Breaches of Anglo-American Treaties, (New York: Sturgis & 
Walton, 1917) at 17. 
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Jay Treaty, 19 which reiterated Article III and included the British 
concern about subsequent actions by either state. 
The War of 1812 created hindrances to free passage of all indi-
viduals. The Treaty of Ghent,20 signed in 1814, ended the hostili-
ties between Britain and the United States. The right of free passage 
of aboriginal people was reiterated in Article IX of that treaty: 
The United States engage ... to restore to such Tribes or 
Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privi-
leges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 
one thousand eight hundred and eleven. . . . [HJ is 
Britannic Majesty engages on his part ... to restore to 
such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, 
rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or 
been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and 
eleven. 
The Treaty of Ghent was explained to First Nations people by 
the British Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in 
1815 at Burlington, Ontario: 
I will now repeat to you one of the Articles of the Treaty 
of Peace which secures to you the Peaceable possession of 
all the country which you possessed before the late War, 
and the Road is now open and free for you to pass and 
repass it without interruption.21 
At a time when it was of advantage to Britain to ensure the 
rights of the First Nations people, those rights were assiduously 
protected, with much assurance to the Native peoples that the col-
onizing nations would not interfere with the existence of the First 
Nations. The British and the Americans were then treating the First 
Nations as independent nations. This is evident from the fact that 
"Indians" were distinguished from British subjects and American 
citizens in the various treaties and articles. As well, the fact that 
treaties were concluded between the British and First Nations indi-
cates the independence of the First Nations at that time. 
l9 Explanatory Article to the Third Article of the Jay Treary, 4 May 1796, (U.S.-
Gr. Br.) 8 Stat 130, T.S. no. 106. 
20 Treary of Peace andAmiry, 24 December 1814, (U.S.-Gr. Br.), 13 Bevans 41. 
21 O'Brien, supra note 1 at 320. 
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III. THE AMERICAN POSITION 
1. Immigration 
In 1924, the United States passed their first Immigration Act to re-
strict border crossing rights of First Nations people from Canada.22 
The Immigration Act, read in conjunction with the Citizenship Act, 23 
which granted citizenship to U.S. born aboriginals, had the effect of 
subjecting Canadian born aboriginals to the same immigration laws 
as other non-U.S. citizens. 
In 1925, Paul Diabo was arrested by U.S. Immigration officials. 
He was a Mohawk from the Quebec side of the Mohawk reserve 
working in the United States. Immigration officials arrested him 
for working without authorization from U.S. Immigration. Diabo 
challenged the arrest on the grounds that Article III of the Jay 
Treaty guaranteed his immunity from the provisions of American 
immigration laws.24 The Court agreed, and stated that: 
[T]hat article did not create the right of the Indian to 
pass over land actually in their possession, for, subject to 
the general dominant right of sovereignty claimed by all 
European nations based on discovery, the right of the 
Indian to possess the soil until he surrendered his right by 
sale or treaty has been recognized. 25 
Thus, the Court found that the First Nations right not to be im-
peded by the border was an inherent aboriginal right, not a right 
created by the Jay Treaty. The Treaty merely recognized and af-
firmed the right.26 
2. Customs 
U.S. Customs does not allow duty free passage of goods by First 
Nations people to any extent greater than that permitted to every-
one else. Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro 27 (the Karnuth de-
22 The ImmigrationActo/1924, c. 190, s. 13(c), 43 Stat. 153 (U.S.). 
23 Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (U.S.). 
24 McCandlessv. United States ex rel. Diabo, 25 F.2d 71(3dCir.1928). 
25 Supra note 24 at 72. 
26 See also Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210 at 1220 (D. Me 1974) at 1220, 
where the District Court of Maine said that there was an "aboriginal right ... to 
move freely within their own territory without regard to the International 
Boundary and free of the restrictions imposed by the immigration laws." 
27 279 U.S. 231 (1929). 
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cision) considered the impact of the Jay Treaty on non-aboriginal 
people. The U.S. Supreme Court said that Article XXVIII, which 
purported to make the rights in Article III permanent, could not be 
interpreted as guaranteeing them in perpetuity. The War of 1812 
had abrogated the free border-crossing rights. The Treaty of 
Ghent, which reinstated the rights of aboriginal people only, was 
not mentioned in this case. 
A subsequent case, which considered the right of a Canadian 
aboriginal person to take goods into the U.S. duty free, United 
States v. Garrow, 28 used the Karnuth case to determine that Garrow 
did not have such a right, because the War of 1812 had abrogated 
the right. The Treaty of Ghent was, according to the Court, a non-
self executing treaty, and no executing legislation was ever 
implemented. They did not consider the issue of inherent 
aboriginal rights. 
The U.S., then, has two policies with regard to border crossing 
by aboriginals; the people may pass freely, but goods imported by 
aboriginals are subject to duty and taxes. 
IV. THE CANADIAN POSITION 
1. Before 1982 
Section 88 of the Indian Act 29 says: 
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of 
Parliament, all laws of general application from time to 
time in force in any province are applicable to and in re-
spect of Indians in the province, except to the extent that 
those laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, 
rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder, and except 
to the extent that those laws make provision for any mat-
ter for which provision is made by or under this Act. 
In Francis v. R., 30 the Supreme Court of Canada considered 
whether "treaty" in section 88 (then section 87) included the Jay 
Treaty, thus exempting First Nations people from duty and taxes 
payable on imported goods. Louis Francis had bought a used 
washing machine, oil heater, and refrigerator from relatives on the 
23 88 F.2d 318 (C.C.P.A. 1937). 
29 Supra note 5. 
3o [1956] S.C.R. 618. 
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American side of the Caughnawaga Mohawk reserve (which is di-
vided by the border). Canada Customs charged him the duty and 
taxes on the items, which he paid under protest. The Court found 
that, although legislation exempting Native people was imple-
mented shortly after the Jay Treaty was ratified, at the time that 
Francis imported the goods there was no such legislation in effect. 
Parliament had the authority to amend or repeal the legislation 
and, in any event, the Jay Treaty rights were abrogated by the War 
of 1812. Here, the Court said that the state of war had made it im-
possible that subjects of one sovereignty should freely pass into the 
territory of another. It was not considered that at the time of the 
war, First Nations people were not subjects of any sovereignty in 
their own view or in the view of the British, as evidenced by the 
distinction made between His Majesty's subjects and "Indians" in 
the Treaty. The Indian Act, 31 in section 87 (now section 88), only 
exempted aboriginal people from legislation that conflicted with 
treaties between Canada (or Britain in right of Canada) and First 
Nations, not treaties to which the First Nations were not signato-
ries. The Supreme Court of Canada followed the Karnuth and 
Garrow decisions of U.S. Courts.32 
2. After 1982 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 33 reads as follows: 
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes 
the Indian, Inuit and Meris peoples of Canada. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal considered whether section 35 al-
tered the aboriginal position with respect to the Jay Treaty in R. v. 
Vincent. 34 Elizabeth Vincent is a member of the Lorette Huron 
Band. She was found in possession of $1680 worth of tobacco, on 
which no duty had not been paid, and $60,030 in cash. She admit-
ted that she intended to sell the tobacco in her store on the reserve. 
The Court first considered whether Article III of the Jay Treaty 
would exempt her from customs duties and taxes. The appellant 
3l Supra note 5. 
32 Supra notes 27 and 28. 
33 Schedule B of the Canada Act (U.K) 1982, c. 11. 
34 (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 427, leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused 
14 October 1993. 
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relied on a French version of Article III, which would exempt First 
Nations people from duties on "leurs pro pres effets et marchandises 
de quelque nature qu'ils soient" (emphasis added). The Court re-
jected this argument because the Jay Treaty was between the U.S. 
and Great Britain, in English, and there was no official French ver-
sion. The version provided by the appellant was a translation of the 
English treaty. The English version makes no allusion to an exemp-
tion for commercial goods other than pelts.35 The Court said: 
In this case, the tobacco imported by the applicant in 
seven large cardboard boxes could not be considered ex-
empt from duty, because the tobacco was "goods in bales 
or other large packages unusual among Indians." We re-
ject the appellant's argument that the expression "their 
own goods and effects" excludes only goods not belong-
ing to Indians.36 
The Court then, in obiter dicta, discussed whether the Jay 
Treaty was a treaty within the meaning of section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. If, the Court said, the word "treaty" in the 
Constitution Act was to be given the same meaning as in section 88 
of the Indian Act, then Francis 37 would dictate that the Jay Treaty 
was not a treaty within the meaning of section 35. 
Lacourciere J.A., then considered the opinions of various au-
thors, including Lysyk, Slattery, and Hogg, on whether subsection 
35(1) is broad enough to include treaties that benefit aboriginals. 
The authors agreed that it may be broad enough, but expressed un-
certainty (Vincent was the first case to discuss this). The Court took 
this uncertainty to be a point against such an interpretation: 
the final conclusion of the first judge does not seem to be 
clearly supported by the learned authors who leave some 
doubt on the question.38 
In addition, the Court asserted that the framers of the 
Constitution Act must have intended the word "treaties" to mean 
that which it meant in previous Canadian decisions, or they would 
have used a different word. This, despite the holding in Edwards v. 
35 There is still no duty imposed on pelts from the U.S., whether worked or not, 
according to Chapter 41 of the Tariff Code. 
36 Supra note 34 at 432. 
37 Supra note 30. 
38 Supra note 34 at 435. 
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A.G. Can. that constitutional interpretation is to be carried out with 
a view to the Constitution as a "living tree capable of growth and 
expansion within its natural limits."39 Also, in the B. C. Motor 
Vehicle Reference, 40 Lamer, J. said that framers' intent was to be 
given little weight in interpretation, lest it "stunt the growth" of the 
living tree. 
The Court then stated that it accepted the arguments of the 
Attorney General of Canada that to accept that international 
treaties of benefit to "Indians" would derogate from the 
sovereignty of Canada to alter those agreements. This argument 
was based on the fact that permission of the aboriginal people 
would be required, even if the other signatory to the treaty failed to 
uphold its obligations. With respect, these arguments should not go 
to the interpretation of the constitutional provision in defining the 
right, but rather to limitations on the right, if such are found ap-
propriate. This approach is more consistent with a broad and liberal 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
The fact that aboriginal rights under treaty are given constitu-
tional status ought also to affect the subsequent finding by the 
Court that international treaties cannot confer rights upon subjects 
of the signatory countries. Aboriginal people have a different status 
from Canadian citizens and U.S. citizens. 
Further, the Court finds, even if the Jay Treaty was a treaty 
within the meaning of section 35, the rights in Article III were ex-
tinguished prior to that date. Here, the Court refers to and follows 
Karnuth and Garrow. 41 Those cases were, however, American cases. 
If the right had been extinguished, it would have to be by an act of 
the Canadian government, not by the American government. 
There are further considerations, not discussed by the Court in 
Vincent, on the issue of the inclusion of the Jay Treaty under sec-
tion 35. First, there would be no Anglo-First Nations treaties with 
respect to free passage of the border because of the existence of the 
Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent. The First Nations were made 
aware of the existence of those treaties, 42 and would not therefore 
bargain for a right they already had. A broad and purposive inter-
pretation of section 35 would tal<:e this into account. 
39 [1930] A.C. 114 (P.C.) at 136. 
40 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 509. 
41 Supra notes 27 and 28. 
42 See supra notes 16 and 21 and accompanying discussion. 
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Second, implementation of the treaties would entail an absence 
of legislation. Subsequent legislation may have been enacted with-
out awareness of the provisions of the treaties, and would go to 
whether the right had been extinguished, not whether it ever be-
came effective. 
Section 35 also refers to aboriginal rights. The Court in Vincent 
does not discuss this. A case currently being considered deals with 
aboriginal rights with respect to free passage of the border.43 Tracey 
Ann Smith is a member of an American Indian Band and has U.S. 
citizenship. She is also a member of the Stanjikoming First Nation 
in Ontario, by virtue of the Stanjikoming First Nation Band 
Membership Code, but is not a status Indian under the Indian 
Act. 44 Her common law spouse lives at Stanjikoming First Nation. 
She was denied entry to Canada on the grounds that she did not 
have status and had not been granted an immigrant visa pursuant to 
subsection 9(1) of the Immigration Act. 45 She will argue that the 
right to cross the border freely is an aboriginal right within the 
meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that sub-
section 9(1) of the Immigration Act is inconsistent with that right. 
Aboriginal rights stem from aboriginal sovereignty. They are 
inherent, not created by acts of Parliament. Dickson, ]. (as he then 
was) found, in Guerin v. The Queen, 46 that the source of aboriginal 
rights is independent of acts of the Canadian government (or 
Britain acting in right of Canada), and predates them. This is reit-
erated in R. v. Sparrow, 47 where the Court also says that an aborig-
inal right must have been exercised prior to the arrival of the 
colonists and have been an integral part of the First Nations com-
munity. This would surely apply to border crossing rights, given 
that the border is a construction of U.S. and British relations, and is 
irrelevant to First Nations. The notion of inherent aboriginal rights 
concurs with the U.S. decision in Diabo, 48 where the U.S. court 
found that the Jay Treaty had not created the right of free passage; 
the right had existed prior to the signing of the treaty. And, the 
43 See Smith v. Canada, [1993] 2 C.N.L.R. 190 (Ont. Gen. Div.), additional 
reasons in (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 215 (Gen. Div.), leave to appeal refused (1994), 23 
Imm. LR. (2d) 235 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
44 Supra note 5. 
45 Supra note 3. 
46 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. 
47 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
48 Supra note 24. 
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fact that "Indians" were distinguished from Americans and British 
subjects in the early documents, and the existence of Anglo-First 
Nations treaties indicates that the British themselves thought of the 
First Nations as independents, who had existing sovereignty prior 
to the arrival of the Europeans. 
If the aboriginal right to cross the border had been extinguished 
prior to 1982, then it would not be protected by section 3 5. The 
test for extinguishment, set forth in Calder v. British Columbia 
(A.G.) 49 and reiterated in Sparrow, 5o is that Parliament must have 
demonstrated a clear intent to extinguish the right. This would not 
be accomplished by U.S. regulation of border crossing, nor would 
U.S. cases be of any assistance in deciding this. Even the existence 
of the Immigration Act and other Canadian legislation regulating 
border crossing would probably not be sufficient. In Sparrow, the 
Court rejected the argument that Parliament extinguishes an 
aboriginal right by passing legislation inconsistent with the exercise 
of that right. In the context of Sparrow, this means that fisheries 
regulations were merely regulating the exercise of the right, and 
were not to be taken as extinguishing it. The Court also rejected the 
argument that the right existed in the form that it took in 1982 
(i.e.: limited by the regulations), as that would imply that 
Parliament had partly extinguished the right, an action which re-
quired clear and plain intent to be shown. 
If it is held that section 35 protects aboriginal rights to crossing 
borders, then the next question is, to whom does it apply? 
Subsection 35(2) limits the application of subsection 35(1) to the 
"Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada" (emphasis added). If 
this is interpreted narrowly to refer to people with status recognized 
under the Indian Act and born in Canada, then Smith ends up 
trapped in a circular argument. The Canadian government and the 
border still restrict the movement of aboriginal peoples. If, however, 
it includes members of Canadian bands, as determined by the 
bands themselves, then some control will rest with the First 
Nations, but the border will still define which Nations have that 
control. 
The American response, under the Jay Treaty, has been to con-
sider the right to be based on racial characteristics rather than on 
49 [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
50 Supra note 47. 
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political affiliation. 51 This was reflected in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, 52 which defined those entitled to pass the 
border freely as those with at least 50 percent Indian blood, who 
were not adopted members of families or tribes. This still gives con-
trol to the government, rather than to the First Nations, because the 
government defines who is aboriginal. The best solution would be 
to have the bands decide to whom the right should be extended, ei-
ther by extending membership to individuals, or by defining eligi-
ble groups. 
Once it has been determined who has the right to cross the 
border freely, it must be determined what is encompassed by that 
right. American jurisprudence has held that it entitles aboriginal 
people freely to enter and work in the U.S., to collect social bene-
fits, and to be immune from deportation.53 The Canadian response 
might be to read the group that is eligible for the right into 
subsection 4(3) of the Immigration Act, thus guaranteeing them the 
same rights and obligations of First Nations people with status un-
der the Indian Act and Canadian citizens. This would mean that the 
right would encompass freedom from visa and authorization re-
quirements, inapplicability of inadmissible persons categories, and 
freedom from deportation. Anything less would be inconsistent 
with the underlying notion that free passage of the border is an in-
herent aboriginal right. However, the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
Sparrow, allowed for the possibility of a limitation on aboriginal 
rights, if there is a valid legislative objective (more specific than 
"public policy"), if the limitation is consistent with the Crown's his-
toric fiduciary obligation to aboriginal peoples, and if the limitation 
is minimal and is arrived at after consultation with aboriginal 
groups.54 
V. CONCLUSION 
Arguments have been presented here for the recognition by the 
Canadian legal system of the inherent aboriginal right to cross the 
border. This is not to say that the right exists only upon recognition 
5! United States ex rel. Goodwin v. Karnuth, 74 F. Supp. 660 (W.D.N.Y. 1947). 
52 Ch. 477, s. 289, 66 Stat. 163, 234 (1952). 
53 See, Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210 (D.Me 1974), and Yellowquill, 16 I. & 
N. Dec. 576, as cited in O'Brien, supra note 1. 
54 Supra note 47 at 1114. 
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by the courts, but is merely an acknowledgment that First Nations 
must attain control over their rights, either by court challenge, or by 
negotiations with the Canadian government. It may be that the lat-
ter course is more flexible with respect to remedy. Questions of 
who is to be considered aboriginal for the purposes of the right, 
who may determine who is eligible, and who may determine the 
scope of the right could be determined by consultation with aborig-
inal groups. If a court challenge were successful, however, it might 
provide a catalyst for negotiations. 
